Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush
Request for Comments: 6493 Internet Initiative Japan
Category: Standards Track February 2012
ISSN: 2070-1721
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Ghostbusters Record
Abstract
In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource
certificates completely obscure names or any other information that
might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with
issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs,
compromises, etc. This document describes the RPKI Ghostbusters
Record containing human contact information that may be verified
(indirectly) by a Certification Authority (CA) certificate. The data
in the record are those of a severely profiled vCard.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6493.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. vCard Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. CMS Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.1. OID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.2. File Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.3. Media Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
In the operational use of the RPKI, it can become necessary to
contact, human to human, the party responsible for a resource-holding
CA certificate, AKA the certificate's maintainer, be it the holder of
the certificate's private key or an administrative person in the
organization, a NOC, etc. An important example is when the operator
of a prefix described by a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) sees a
problem, or an impending problem, with a certificate or Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) in the path between the ROA and a trust anchor.
For example, a certificate along that path has expired, is soon to
expire, or a CRL associated with a CA along the path is stale, thus
placing the quality of the routing of the address space described by
the ROA in jeopardy.
As the names in RPKI certificates are not meaningful to humans, see
[RFC6484], there is no way to use a certificate itself to lead to the
worrisome certificate's or CRL's maintainer. So, "Who you gonna
call?"
This document specifies the RPKI Ghostbusters Record, an object
verified via an end-entity (EE) certificate, issued under a CA
certificate, the maintainer of which may be contacted using the
payload information in the Ghostbusters Record.
The Ghostbusters Record conforms to the syntax defined in [RFC6488].
The payload of this signed object is a severely profiled vCard.
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Note that the Ghostbusters Record is not an identity certificate, but
rather an attestation to the contact data made by the maintainer of
the CA certificate issuing the EE certificate whose corresponding
private key signs the Ghostbusters Record.
This record is not meant to supplant or be used as resource registry
whois data. It gives information about an RPKI CA certificate
maintainer, not a resource holder.
The Ghostbusters Record is optional; CA certificates in the RPKI can
have zero or more associated Ghostbuster Records.
Given a certificate, to find the closest Ghostbuster Record, go up
until a CA certificate is reached, which may be the object itself of
course. That CA certificate will have Subject Information Access
(SIA) to the publication point where all subsidiary objects (until
you hit a down-chain CA certificate's signed objects) are published.
The publication point will contain zero or more Ghostbuster Records.
This specification has three main sections. The first, Section 5, is
the format of the contact payload information, a severely profiled
vCard. The second, Section 6, profiles the packaging of the payload
as a profile of the RPKI Signed Object Template specification
[RFC6488]. The third, Section 7, describes the proper validation of
the signed Ghostbusters Record.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI [RFC6480], the
RPKI Repository Structure [RFC6481], Signed RPKI Objects [RFC6488],
and vCards [RFC6350].
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4. RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example
An example of an RPKI Ghostbusters Record payload with all properties
populated is as follows:
BEGIN:VCARD
VERSION:4.0
FN:Human's Name
ORG:Organizational Entity
ADR;TYPE=WORK:;;42 Twisty Passage;Deep Cavern;WA;98666;U.S.A.
TEL;TYPE=VOICE,TEXT,WORK;VALUE=uri:tel:+1-666-555-1212
TEL;TYPE=FAX,WORK;VALUE=uri:tel:+1-666-555-1213
EMAIL:human@example.com
END:VCARD
5. vCard Profile
The goal in profiling the vCard is not to include as much information
as possible, but rather to include as few properties as possible
while providing the minimal necessary data to enable one to contact
the maintainer of the RPKI data that threatens the ROA[s] of concern.
The Ghostbusters vCard payload is a minimalist subset of the vCard as
described in [RFC6350].
BEGIN - pro forma packaging that MUST be the first line in the vCard
and MUST have the value "BEGIN:VCARD" as described in [RFC6350].
VERSION - pro forma packaging that MUST be the second line in the
vCard and MUST have the value "VERSION:4.0" as described in
Section 3.7.9 of [RFC6350].
FN - the name, as described in Section 6.2.1 of [RFC6350], of a
contactable person or role who is responsible for the CA
certificate.
ORG - an organization as described in Section 6.6.4 of [RFC6350].
ADR - a postal address as described in Section 6.3 of [RFC6350].
TEL - a voice and/or fax phone as described in Section 6.4.1 of
[RFC6350].
EMAIL - an Email address as described in Section 6.4.2 of [RFC6350]
END - pro forma packaging that MUST be the last line in the vCard
and MUST have the value "END:VCARD" as described in [RFC6350].
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Per [RFC6350], the BEGIN, VERSION, FN, and END properties MUST be
included in a record. To be useful, at least one of ADR, TEL, and
EMAIL MUST be included. Other properties MUST NOT be included.
6. CMS Packaging
The Ghostbusters Record is a CMS signed-data object conforming to the
"Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", [RFC6488].
The content-type of a Ghostbusters Record is defined as id-ct-
rpkiGhostbusters, and has the numerical value of
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35. This OID MUST appear both within the
eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-
type signed attribute in the signerInfo object. See [RFC6488].
eContent: The content of a Ghostbusters Record is described in
Section 5.
Similarly to a ROA, a Ghostbusters Record is verified using an EE
certificate issued by the resource-holding CA certificate whose
maintainer is described in the vCard.
The EE certificate used to verify the Ghostbusters Record is the one
that appears in the CMS data structure that contains the payload
defined above.
This EE certificate MUST describe its Internet Number Resources using
the "inherit" attribute, rather than explicit description of a
resource set; see [RFC3779].
7. Validation
The validation procedure defined in Section 3 of [RFC6488] is applied
to a Ghostbusters Record. After this procedure has been performed,
the Version number type within the payload is checked, and the OCTET
STRING containing the vCard data is extracted. These data are
checked against the profile defined in Section 5 of this document.
Only if all of these checks pass is the Ghostbusters payload deemed
valid and made available to the application that requested the
payload.
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8. Security Considerations
Though there is no on-the-wire protocol in this specification, there
are attacks that could abuse the data described. As the data, to be
useful, need to be public, little can be done to avoid this exposure.
Phone Numbers: The vCards may contain real world telephone numbers,
which could be abused for telemarketing, abusive calls, etc.
Email Addresses: The vCards may contain Email addresses, which could
be abused for purposes of spam.
Relying parties are hereby warned that the data in a Ghostbusters
Record are self-asserted. These data have not been verified by the
CA that issued the CA certificate to the entity that issued the EE
certificate used to validate the Ghostbusters Record.
9. IANA Considerations
9.1. OID
The IANA has registered the OID for the Ghostbusters Record in the
registry created by [RFC6488] as follows:
Name OID Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ghostbusters 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35 [RFC6493]
9.2. File Extension
Realizing the deep issues raised by [RFC5513], the IANA has added an
item for the Ghostbusters Record file extension to the "RPKI
Repository Name Scheme" created by [RFC6481] as follows:
Filename Extension RPKI Object Reference
-----------------------------------------------------------
.gbr Ghostbusters Record [RFC6493]
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9.3. Media Type
The IANA has registered the media type application/rpki-ghostbusters
as follows:
Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-ghostbusters
Required parameters: None
Optional parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI Ghostbusters Record
[RFC6493].
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: This document.
Applications that use this media type: RPKI administrators.
Additional information:
Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
in [RFC6488], which contains a payload
of a profiled vCard as defined above in this document.
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .gbr
Macintosh file type code(s):
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Author: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Change controller: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
10. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Russ Housley, the authors of [RFC6481],
Stephen Kent, Sandy Murphy, Rob Austein, Michael Elkins, and Barry
Leiba for their contributions.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC6350] Perreault, S., "vCard Format Specification", RFC 6350,
August 2011.
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[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, February 2012.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC5513] Farrel, A., "IANA Considerations for Three Letter
Acronyms", RFC 5513, April 1 2009.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)"", RFC 6484, February 2012.
Author's Address
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US
Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
EMail: randy@psg.com
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