Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. McGrew
Request for Comments: 6655 Cisco Systems
Category: Standards Track D. Bailey
ISSN: 2070-1721 RSA, Security Division of EMC
July 2012
AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Abstract
This memo describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
in the Counter with Cipher Block Chaining - Message Authentication
Code (CBC-MAC) Mode (CCM) of operation within Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram TLS (DTLS) to provide confidentiality and
data origin authentication. The AES-CCM algorithm is amenable to
compact implementations, making it suitable for constrained
environments.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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RFC 6655 AES-CCM Ciphersuites July 2012
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RSA-Based AES-CCM Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. PSK-Based AES-CCM Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. TLS Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. New AEAD Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. AES-128-CCM with an 8-Octet Integrity Check Value (ICV) . . 6
6.2. AES-256-CCM with a 8-Octet Integrity Check Value (ICV) . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.1. Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.2. Counter Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
This document describes the use of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[AES] in Counter with CBC-MAC Mode (CCM) [CCM] in several TLS
ciphersuites. AES-CCM provides both authentication and
confidentiality and uses as its only primitive the AES encrypt
operation (the AES decrypt operation is not needed). This makes it
amenable to compact implementations, which is advantageous in
constrained environments. Of course, adoption outside of constrained
environments is necessary to enable interoperability, such as that
between web clients and embedded servers or between embedded clients
and web servers. The use of AES-CCM has been specified for IPsec
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4309] and 802.15.4 wireless
networks [IEEE802154].
Authenticated encryption, in addition to providing confidentiality
for the plaintext that is encrypted, provides a way to check its
integrity and authenticity. Authenticated Encryption with Associated
Data, or AEAD [RFC5116], adds the ability to check the integrity and
authenticity of some associated data that is not encrypted. This
document utilizes the AEAD facility within TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and the
AES-CCM-based AEAD algorithms defined in [RFC5116]. Additional AEAD
algorithms are defined that use AES-CCM but have shorter
authentication tags and are therefore more suitable for use across
networks in which bandwidth is constrained and message sizes may be
small.
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The ciphersuites defined in this document use RSA or Pre-Shared Key
(PSK) as their key establishment mechanism; these ciphersuites can be
used with DTLS [RFC6347]. Since the ability to use AEAD ciphers was
introduced in DTLS version 1.2, the ciphersuites defined in this
document cannot be used with earlier versions of that protocol.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. RSA-Based AES-CCM Cipher Suites
The ciphersuites defined in this document are based on the AES-CCM
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms
AEAD_AES_128_CCM and AEAD_AES_256_CCM described in [RFC5116]. The
following RSA-based ciphersuites are defined:
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM = {0xC0,0x9C}
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM = {0xC0,0x9D)
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM = {0xC0,0x9E}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM = {0xC0,0x9F}
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA0}
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA1)
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA2}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA3}
These ciphersuites make use of the AEAD capability in TLS 1.2
[RFC5246]. Each uses AES-CCM; those that end in "_8" have an 8-octet
authentication tag, while the other ciphersuites have 16-octet
authentication tags.
The Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) truncation option
described in Section 7 of [RFC6066] (which negotiates the
"truncated_hmac" TLS extension) does not have an effect on cipher
suites that do not use HMAC.
The "nonce" input to the AEAD algorithm is exactly that of [RFC5288]:
the "nonce" SHALL be 12 bytes long and is constructed as follows:
(this is an example of a "partially explicit" nonce; see Section
3.2.1 in [RFC5116]).
struct {
opaque salt[4];
opaque nonce_explicit[8];
} CCMNonce;
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The salt is the "implicit" part of the nonce and is not sent in the
packet. Instead, the salt is generated as part of the handshake
process: it is either the client_write_IV (when the client is
sending) or the server_write_IV (when the server is sending). The
salt length (SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length) is 4 octets. The
nonce_explicit is the "explicit" part of the nonce. It is chosen by
the sender and is carried in each TLS record in the
GenericAEADCipher.nonce_explicit field. The nonce_explicit length
(SecurityParameters.record_iv_length) is 8 octets. Each value of the
nonce_explicit MUST be distinct for each distinct invocation of the
GCM encrypt function for any fixed key. Failure to meet this
uniqueness requirement can significantly degrade security. The
nonce_explicit MAY be the 64-bit sequence number (as long as those
values are assured to meet the distinctness requirement).
In DTLS, the 64-bit seq_num is the 16-bit epoch concatenated with the
48-bit seq_num.
When the nonce_explicit is equal to the sequence number, the CCMNonce
will have the structure of the CCMNonceExample given below.
struct {
uint32 client_write_IV; // low order 32-bits
uint64 seq_num; // TLS sequence number
} CCMClientNonce.
struct {
uint32 server_write_IV; // low order 32-bits
uint64 seq_num; // TLS sequence number
} CCMServerNonce.
struct {
case client:
CCMClientNonce;
case server:
CCMServerNonce:
} CCMNonceExample;
These ciphersuites make use of the default TLS 1.2 Pseudorandom
Function (PRF), which uses HMAC with the SHA-256 hash function. The
RSA and DHE_RSA, key exchange is performed as defined in [RFC5246].
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4. PSK-Based AES-CCM Cipher Suites
As in Section 3, these ciphersuites follow [RFC5116]. The PSK and
DHE_PSK key exchange is performed as in [RFC4279]. The following
ciphersuites are defined:
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM = {0xC0,0xA4}
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM = {0xC0,0xA5)
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM = {0xC0,0xA6}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM = {0xC0,0xA7}
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA8}
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA9)
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xAA}
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xAB}
The "nonce" input to the AEAD algorithm is defined as in Section 3.
These ciphersuites make use of the default TLS 1.2 Pseudorandom
Function (PRF), which uses HMAC with the SHA-256 hash function. The
PSK and DHE_PSK key exchange is performed as defined in [RFC5487].
5. TLS Versions
These ciphersuites make use of the authenticated encryption with
additional data (AEAD) defined in TLS 1.2 [RFC5288]. Earlier
versions of TLS do not have support for AEAD; for instance, the
TLSCiphertext structure does not have the "aead" option in TLS 1.1.
Consequently, these ciphersuites MUST NOT be negotiated in older
versions of TLS. Clients MUST NOT offer these cipher suites if they
do not offer TLS 1.2 or later. Servers that select an earlier
version of TLS MUST NOT select one of these cipher suites. Because
TLS has no way for the client to indicate that it supports TLS 1.2
but not earlier, a non-compliant server might potentially negotiate
TLS 1.1 or earlier and select one of the cipher suites in this
document. Clients MUST check the TLS version and generate a fatal
"illegal_parameter" alert if they detect an incorrect version.
6. New AEAD Algorithms
The following AEAD algorithms are defined:
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 = 18
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8 = 19
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6.1. AES-128-CCM with an 8-Octet Integrity Check Value (ICV)
The AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 authenticated encryption algorithm is
identical to the AEAD_AES_128_CCM algorithm (see Section 5.3 of
[RFC5116]), except that it uses 8 octets for authentication, instead
of the full 16 octets used by AEAD_AES_128_CCM. The
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 ciphertext consists of the ciphertext output of
the CCM encryption operation concatenated with the 8-octet
authentication tag output of the CCM encryption operation. Test
cases are provided in [CCM]. The input and output lengths are the
same as those for AEAD_AES_128_CCM. An AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 ciphertext
is exactly 8 octets longer than its corresponding plaintext.
6.2. AES-256-CCM with a 8-Octet Integrity Check Value (ICV)
The AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8 authenticated encryption algorithm is
identical to the AEAD_AES_256_CCM algorithm (see Section 5.4 of
[RFC5116]), except that it uses 8 octets for authentication, instead
of the full 16 octets used by AEAD_AES_256_CCM. The
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8 ciphertext consists of the ciphertext output of
the CCM encryption operation concatenated with the 8-octet
authentication tag output of the CCM encryption operation. Test
cases are provided in [CCM]. The input and output lengths are as for
AEAD_AES_128_CCM. An AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 ciphertext is exactly 8
octets longer than its corresponding plaintext.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned the values for the ciphersuites defined in Sections
3 and 4 from the "TLS Cipher Suite" registry and the values of the
AEAD algorithms defined in Section 6 from the "AEAD Algorithms"
registry.
8. Security Considerations
8.1. Perfect Forward Secrecy
The perfect forward secrecy properties of RSA-based TLS ciphersuites
are discussed in the security analysis of [RFC5246]. It should be
noted that only the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman-based ciphersuites are
capable of providing perfect forward secrecy.
8.2. Counter Reuse
AES-CCM security requires that the counter is never reused. The IV
construction in Section 3 is designed to prevent counter reuse.
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9. Acknowledgements
This document borrows heavily from [RFC5288]. Thanks are due to
Stephen Farrell and Robert Cragie for their input.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
[CCM] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality",
SP 800-38C, May 2004.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, December 2005.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for
Authenticated Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
August 2008.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
August 2008.
[RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487,
March 2009.
[RFC6066] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
January 2011.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.
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RFC 6655 AES-CCM Ciphersuites July 2012
10.2. Informative References
[IEEE802154] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Wireless Personal Area Networks", IEEE
Standard 802.15.4-2006, 2006.
[RFC4309] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
CCM Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 4309, December 2005.
Authors' Addresses
David McGrew
Cisco Systems
13600 Dulles Technology Drive
Herndon, VA 20171
USA
EMail: mcgrew@cisco.com
Daniel V. Bailey
RSA, Security Division of EMC
174 Middlesex Tpke.
Bedford, MA 01463
USA
EMail: dbailey@rsa.com
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