Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Manderson
Request for Comments: 6907 ICANN
Category: Informational K. Sriram
ISSN: 2070-1721 US NIST
R. White
Verisign
March 2013
Use Cases and Interpretations
of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects
for Issuers and Relying Parties
Abstract
This document describes a number of use cases together with
directions and interpretations for organizations and relying parties
when creating or encountering Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) object scenarios in the public RPKI. All of these items are
discussed here in relation to the Internet routing system.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6907.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................4
1.1. Terminology ................................................4
1.2. Documentation Prefixes .....................................4
1.3. Definitions ................................................4
2. Overview ........................................................6
2.1. General Interpretation of RPKI Object Semantics ............6
3. Origination Use Cases ...........................................7
3.1. Single Announcement ........................................8
3.2. Aggregate with a More Specific .............................8
3.3. Aggregate with a More Specific from a Different ASN ........9
3.4. Sub-Allocation to a Multi-Homed Customer ...................9
3.5. Restriction of a New Allocation ...........................10
3.6. Restriction of New ASN ....................................11
3.7. Restriction of a Part of an Allocation ....................11
3.8. Restriction of Prefix Length ..............................12
3.9. Restriction of Sub-Allocation Prefix Length ...............13
3.10. Aggregation and Origination by an Upstream Provider ......15
3.11. Rogue Aggregation and Origination by an Upstream
Provider .................................................16
4. Adjacency or Path Validation Use Cases .........................17
5. Partial Deployment Use Cases ...................................18
5.1. Parent Does Not Participate in RPKI .......................18
5.2. Only Some Children Participate in RPKI ....................18
5.3. Grandchild Does Not Participate in RPKI ...................19
6. Transfer Use Cases .............................................20
6.1. Transfer of In-Use Prefix and Autonomous System Number ....20
6.2. Transfer of In-Use Prefix .................................21
6.3. Transfer of Unused Prefix .................................22
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7. Relying Party Use Cases ........................................22
7.1. Prefix-Origin Validation Use Cases ........................22
7.1.1. Covering ROA Prefix, maxLength Satisfied,
and AS Match .......................................23
7.1.2. Covering ROA Prefix, maxLength Exceeded,
and AS Match .......................................23
7.1.3. Covering ROA Prefix, maxLength Satisfied,
and AS Mismatch ....................................23
7.1.4. Covering ROA Prefix, maxLength Exceeded,
and AS Mismatch ....................................24
7.1.5. Covering ROA Prefix Not Found ......................24
7.1.6. Covering ROA Prefix and the ROA Is an AS 0 ROA .....24
7.1.7. Covering ROA Prefix Not Found but ROAs
Exist for a Covering Set of More Specifics .........25
7.1.8. AS_SET in Route and Covering ROA Prefix Not Found ..25
7.1.9. Singleton AS in AS_SET (in the Route),
Covering ROA Prefix, and AS Match ..................26
7.1.10. Singleton AS in AS_SET (in the Route),
Covering ROA Prefix, and AS Mismatch ..............26
7.1.11. Multiple ASs in AS_SET (in the Route) and
Covering ROA Prefix ...............................26
7.1.12. Multiple ASs in AS_SET (in the Route) and
ROAs Exist for a Covering Set of More Specifics ...27
7.2. ROA Expiry or Receipt of a CRL Revoking a ROA .............27
7.2.1. ROA of Parent Prefix Is Revoked ....................27
7.2.2. ROA of Prefix Revoked while Parent Prefix
Has Covering ROA Prefix with Different ASN .........28
7.2.3. ROA of Prefix Revoked while That of Parent
Prefix Prevails ....................................28
7.2.4. ROA of Grandparent Prefix Revoked while
That of Parent Prefix Prevails .....................28
7.2.5. Expiry of ROA of Parent Prefix .....................29
7.2.6. Expiry of ROA of Prefix while Parent Prefix
Has Covering ROA with Different ASN ................29
7.2.7. Expiry of ROA of Prefix while That of
Parent Prefix Prevails .............................29
7.2.8. Expiry of ROA of Grandparent Prefix while
That of Parent Prefix Prevails .....................29
8. Acknowledgements ...............................................30
9. Security Considerations ........................................30
10. References ....................................................30
10.1. Normative References .....................................30
10.2. Informative References ...................................30
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1. Introduction
This document describes a number of use cases together with
directions and interpretations for organizations and relying parties
when creating or encountering Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) object scenarios in the public RPKI. All of these items are
discussed here in relation to the Internet routing system.
1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "A Profile
for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates" [RFC6487], "X.509 Extensions
for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)" [RFC6482], "Validation of Route
Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)" [RFC6483], and "BGP
Prefix Origin Validation" [RFC6811].
1.2. Documentation Prefixes
The documentation prefixes recommended in [RFC5737] are insufficient
for use as example prefixes in this document. Therefore, this
document uses RFC 1918 [RFC1918] address space for constructing
example prefixes.
1.3. Definitions
For all of the use cases in this document, it is assumed that RPKI
objects (e.g., resource certificates, ROAs) validate in accordance
with [RFC6487] and [RFC6480]. In other words, we assume that
corrupted RPKI objects, if any, have been detected and eliminated.
The following definitions are in use in this document. Some of these
definitions are reused or adapted from [RFC6811] with authors'
permission.
Resource: An IP address prefix (simply called prefix or subnet) or
an Autonomous System Number (ASN).
Allocation: A set of resources provided to an entity or organization
for its use.
Sub-allocation: A set of resources subordinate to an allocation
assigned to another entity or organization.
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Prefix: A prefix consists of a pair (IP address, prefix length),
interpreted as is customary (see [RFC4632]).
Route: Data derived from a received BGP update, as defined in
[RFC4271], Section 1.1. The route includes one prefix and an
AS_PATH, among other things.
ROA: Route Origin Authorization (ROA) is an RPKI object signed by a
prefix holder authorizing origination of said prefix from an
origin AS specified in said ROA.
AS 0 ROA: A ROA with ASN value 0 (zero) in the AS ID field. AS 0
ROA is an attestation by a prefix holder that the prefix described
in the ROA, and any more specific prefix, should not be used in a
routing context [RFC6483].
ROA prefix: The prefix from a ROA.
ROA ASN: The origin ASN from a ROA.
maxLength: The maximum length up to which more specific prefixes of
a ROA prefix may be originated from the corresponding ROA ASN.
The maxLength is specified in the ROA.
Route prefix: A prefix derived from a route.
Route origin ASN: The origin AS number derived from a route. The
origin AS number is:
o the rightmost AS in the final segment of the AS_PATH attribute
in the route if that segment is of type AS_SEQUENCE, or
o the BGP speaker's own AS number if that segment is of type
AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE or AS_CONFED_SET or if the AS_PATH is empty,
or
o the distinguished value "NONE" if the final segment of the
AS_PATH attribute is of any other type.
Covering ROA prefix: A ROA prefix that is an exact match or a less
specific when compared to the route prefix under consideration.
In other words, the route prefix is said to have a covering ROA
prefix when there exists a ROA such that the ROA prefix length is
less than or equal to the route prefix length and the ROA prefix
address matches the route prefix address for all bits specified by
the ROA prefix length.
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Covering ROA: If a ROA contains a covering ROA prefix for a route
prefix under consideration, then the ROA is said to be a covering
ROA for the route prefix.
No covering ROA: No covering ROA exists for a route prefix under
consideration.
No other covering ROA: No other covering ROA exists (besides what is
(are) already cited) for a route prefix under consideration.
Multi-homed prefix or subnet: A prefix (i.e., subnet) for which a
route is originated through two or more autonomous systems.
Matched: A route's {prefix, origin AS} pair is said to be matched by
a ROA when the route prefix has a covering ROA, and in addition,
the route prefix length is less than or equal to the maxLength in
said covering ROA and the route origin ASN is equal to the ASN in
said covering ROA.
Given these definitions, any given BGP route will be found to have
one of the following "validation states":
o NotFound: The route prefix has no covering ROA.
o Valid: The route's {prefix, origin AS} pair is matched by at least
one ROA.
o Invalid: The route prefix has at least one covering ROA and the
route's {prefix, origin AS} pair is not matched by any ROA.
It is to be noted that no ROA can have the value "NONE" as its ROA
ASN. Thus, a route whose origin ASN is "NONE" cannot be matched by
any ROA. Similarly, no valid route can have an origin ASN of zero
[AS0-PROC]. Thus, no route can be matched by a ROA whose ASN is zero
(i.e., an AS 0 ROA) [RFC6483].
2. Overview
2.1. General Interpretation of RPKI Object Semantics
In the interpretation of relying parties (RPs), or relying party
routing software, it is important that a 'make before break'
operational policy be applied. In part, this means that an RP should
implement a routing decision process where a route is assumed to be
intended (i.e., considered unsuspicious) unless proven otherwise by
the existence of a valid RPKI object that explicitly invalidates the
route (see Section 7.1 for examples). Also, especially in cases when
a prefix is newly acquired by allocation/sub-allocation or due to
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prefix-ownership transfer, a ROA should be registered in RPKI prior
to advertisement of the prefix in BGP. This is highly recommended
for the following reasons. Observe that in the transfer case
(considering a prefix transfer from Org A to Org B), even though Org
A's resource cert would be revoked before issuing a resource cert to
Org B, there may be some latency before all relying parties discard
the previously received ROA of Org A for that prefix. The latency
may be due to CRL propagation delay in the RPKI system or due to
periodic polling by RPs, etc. Also, observe that in the
sub-allocation case (from parent Org A to child Org B), there may be
an existing ROA registered by Org A (with their own origin ASN) for a
covering aggregate prefix relative to the prefix in consideration.
If the new prefix owner (Org B) has not already registered their own
ROA (i.e., ROA with their origin ASN), then the presence of a
different covering ROA (i.e., one with a different origin ASN)
belonging to Org A would result in invalid assessment for the route
advertised by the new owner (Org B). Thus, in both cases (transfer
or sub-allocation), it is prudent for the new owner (Org B) to ensure
that its route for the prefix will be valid by proactively issuing a
ROA before advertising the route. The ROA should be issued with
sufficient lead time taking into consideration the RPKI propagation
delays.
As stated earlier in Section 1.3, for all of the use cases in this
document, it is assumed that RPKI objects (e.g., resource
certificates, ROAs) validate in accordance with [RFC6487] and
[RFC6480]. In other words, we assume that corrupted RPKI objects, if
any, have been detected and eliminated.
While many of the examples provided here illustrate organizations
using their own autonomous system numbers to originate routes, it
should be recognized that a prefix holder need not necessarily be the
holder of the autonomous system number used for the route
origination.
3. Origination Use Cases
This section deals with the various use cases where an organization
has Internet resources and will announce routes to the Internet.
It is based on operational observations of the existing routing
system. In the following use cases, the phrase "relying parties
interpret the route as intended" is generally meant to indicate that
"relying parties interpret an announced route as having a valid
origination AS".
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3.1. Single Announcement
An organization (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.2.0/24. It wishes to announce the /24 prefix from ASN 64496
such that relying parties interpret the route as intended.
The desired announcement (and organization) would be:
+----------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Organization |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.2.0/24 | AS 64496 | Org A |
+----------------------------------------------+
The issuing party should create a ROA containing the following:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.2.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
3.2. Aggregate with a More Specific
An organization (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16. It wishes to announce the more specific prefix
10.1.0.0/20 from ASN 64496 as well as the aggregate route such that
relying parties interpret the routes as intended.
The desired announcements (and organization) would be:
+----------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Organization |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS 64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS 64496 | Org A |
+----------------------------------------------+
The issuing party should create a ROA containing the following:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 16 |
| |-----------------------------------+
| | 10.1.0.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
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3.3. Aggregate with a More Specific from a Different ASN
An organization (Org A with ASN 64496 and ASN 64511) has been
allocated the prefix 10.1.0.0/16. It wishes to announce the more
specific prefix 10.1.0.0/20 from ASN 64511 as well as the aggregate
route from ASN 64496 such that relying parties interpret the routes
as intended.
The desired announcements (and organization) would be:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS 64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS 64511 | Org A |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing party should create ROAs containing the following:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 16 |
+----------------------------------------------+
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64511 | 10.1.0.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
3.4. Sub-Allocation to a Multi-Homed Customer
An organization (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16; it wishes to announce the more specific prefix
10.1.0.0/20 from ASN 64496. It has further delegated 10.1.16.0/20 to
a customer (Org B with ASN 64511) who is multi-homed and will
originate the prefix route from ASN 64511. ASN 64496 will also
announce the aggregate route such that relying parties interpret the
routes as intended.
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The desired announcements (and organizations) would be:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS 64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS 64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.16.0/20 | AS 64511 | Org B |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing party should create ROAs containing the following:
Org A:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 16 |
| |-----------------------------------+
| | 10.1.0.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org B:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64511 | 10.1.16.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
3.5. Restriction of a New Allocation
An organization has recently been allocated the prefix 10.1.0.0/16.
Its network deployment is not yet ready to announce the prefix and
wishes to restrict all possible announcements of 10.1.0.0/16 and more
specifics in routing using RPKI.
The following announcements would be considered undesirable:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | ANY AS | ANY |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | ANY AS | ANY |
| 10.1.17.0/24 | ANY AS | ANY |
+---------------------------------------------+
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The issuing party should create a ROA containing the following:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 32 |
+----------------------------------------------+
This is known as an AS 0 ROA [RFC6483]. Also, please see the
definition and related comments in Section 1.3.
3.6. Restriction of New ASN
An organization has recently been allocated an additional ASN 64511.
Its network deployment is not yet ready to use this ASN and wishes to
restrict all possible uses of ASN 64511 using RPKI.
The following announcement would be considered undesirable:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization |
+---------------------------------------------+
| ANY | AS 64511 | ANY |
+---------------------------------------------+
It is currently not possible to restrict use of autonomous system
numbers.
3.7. Restriction of a Part of an Allocation
An organization (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16. Its network topology permits the announcement of
10.1.0.0/17. Org A wishes to restrict any possible announcement of
10.1.128.0/17 or more specifics of that /17 using RPKI.
The desired announcement (and organization) would be:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/17 | AS 64496 | Org A |
+---------------------------------------------+
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The following announcements would be considered undesirable:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.128.0/17 | ANY AS | ANY |
| 10.1.128.0/24 | ANY AS | ANY |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing party should create ROAs containing the following:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/17 | 17 |
+----------------------------------------------+
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 10.1.128.0/17 | 32 |
+----------------------------------------------+
3.8. Restriction of Prefix Length
An organization (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16; it wishes to announce the aggregate and any or all more
specific prefixes up to and including a maximum length of /20, but
never any more specific than a /20.
Examples of the desired announcements (and organization) would be:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS 64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/17 | AS 64496 | Org A |
| ... | AS 64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.128.0/20 | AS 64496 | Org A |
+---------------------------------------------+
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The following announcements would be considered undesirable:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/21 | ANY AS | ANY |
| 10.1.0.0/22 | ANY AS | ANY |
| ... | ANY AS | ANY |
| 10.1.128.0/24 | ANY AS | ANY |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing party should create a ROA containing the following:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
3.9. Restriction of Sub-Allocation Prefix Length
An organization (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16. It sub-allocates several /20 prefixes to its multi-
homed customers: Org B with ASN 64501 and Org C with ASN 64499,
respectively. It wishes to restrict those customers from advertising
any corresponding routes more specific than a /22.
The desired announcements (and organizations) would be:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS 64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS 64501 | Org B |
| 10.1.128.0/20 | AS 64499 | Org C |
| 10.1.4.0/22 | AS 64501 | Org B |
+---------------------------------------------+
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The following example announcements (and organizations) would be
considered undesirable:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS 64501 | Org B |
| 10.1.128.0/24 | AS 64499 | Org C |
| ..... | ... | ... |
| 10.1.0.0/23 | ANY AS | ANY |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing party (Org A) should create ROAs containing the
following:
For Org A:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 16 |
+----------------------------------------------+
For Org B:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64501 | 10.1.0.0/20 | 22 |
+----------------------------------------------+
For Org C:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64499 | 10.1.128.0/20 | 22 |
+----------------------------------------------+
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3.10. Aggregation and Origination by an Upstream Provider
Consider four organizations with the following resources, which were
acquired independently from any transit provider.
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Organization | ASN | Prefix |
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Org A | AS 64496 | 10.1.0.0/24 |
| Org B | AS 64505 | 10.1.3.0/24 |
| Org C | AS 64499 | 10.1.1.0/24 |
| Org D | AS 64511 | 10.1.2.0/24 |
+-------------------------------------------------+
These organizations share a common upstream provider Transit X
(ASN 64497) that originates an aggregate of these prefixes with the
permission of all four organizations.
The desired announcements (and organizations) would be:
+----------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Organization |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS 64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.3.0/24 | AS 64505 | Org B |
| 10.1.1.0/24 | AS 64499 | Org C |
| 10.1.2.0/24 | AS 64511 | Org D |
| 10.1.0.0/22 | AS 64497 | Transit X |
+----------------------------------------------+
It is currently not possible for an upstream provider to make a valid
aggregate announcement of independent prefixes. However, the issuing
parties should create ROAs containing the following:
Org A:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org B:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64505 | 10.1.3.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
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Org C:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64499 | 10.1.1.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org D:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64511 | 10.1.2.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
3.11. Rogue Aggregation and Origination by an Upstream Provider
Consider four organizations with the following resources that were
acquired independently from any transit provider.
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Organization | ASN | Prefix |
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Org A | AS 64496 | 10.1.0.0/24 |
| Org B | AS 64503 | 10.1.3.0/24 |
| Org C | AS 64499 | 10.1.1.0/24 |
| Org D | AS 64511 | 10.1.2.0/24 |
+-------------------------------------------------+
These organizations share a common upstream provider Transit X
(ASN 64497) that originates an aggregate of these prefixes where
possible. In this situation, Org B (ASN 64503, 10.1.3.0/24) does not
wish for its prefix to be aggregated by the upstream provider.
The desired announcements (and organizations) would be:
+----------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Organization |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS 64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.3.0/24 | AS 64503 | Org B |
| 10.1.1.0/24 | AS 64499 | Org C |
| 10.1.2.0/24 | AS 64511 | Org D |
| 10.1.0.0/23 | AS 64497 | Transit X |
+----------------------------------------------+
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The following announcement would be considered undesirable:
+----------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Organization |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/22 | AS 64497 | Transit X |
+----------------------------------------------+
It is currently not possible for an upstream provider to make a valid
aggregate announcement of independent prefixes. However, the issuing
parties should create ROAs containing the following:
Org A:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org B:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64503 | 10.1.3.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org C:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64499 | 10.1.1.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org D:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64511 | 10.1.2.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
4. Adjacency or Path Validation Use Cases
Use cases pertaining to adjacency or path validation are beyond the
scope of this document and would be addressed in a separate document.
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5. Partial Deployment Use Cases
5.1. Parent Does Not Participate in RPKI
An organization (Org A with ASN 64511) is multi-homed and has been
assigned the prefix 10.1.0.0/20 from its upstream (Transit X with
ASN 64496). Org A wishes to announce the prefix 10.1.0.0/20 from
ASN 64511 to its other upstream(s). Org A also wishes to create RPKI
statements about the resource; however, Transit X (ASN 64496), which
announces the aggregate 10.1.0.0/16, has not yet adopted RPKI.
The desired announcements (and organization with RPKI adoption)
would be:
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization | RPKI |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS 64511 | Org A | Yes |
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS 64496 | Transit X | No |
+----------------------------------------------------+
RPKI is strictly hierarchical; therefore, if Transit X does not
participate in RPKI, Org A is unable to validly issue RPKI objects.
5.2. Only Some Children Participate in RPKI
An organization (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16 and participates in RPKI; it wishes to announce the more
specific prefix 10.1.0.0/20 from ASN 64496. It has further delegated
10.1.16.0/20 and 10.1.32.0/20 to customers Org B with ASN 64511 and
Org C with ASN 64502 (respectively), who are multi-homed. Org B
(ASN 64511) does not participate in RPKI. Org C (ASN 64502)
participates in RPKI.
The desired announcements (and organizations with RPKI adoption)
would be:
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization | RPKI |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS 64496 | Org A | Yes |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS 64496 | Org A | Yes |
| 10.1.16.0/20 | AS 64511 | Org B | No |
| 10.1.32.0/20 | AS 64502 | Org C | Yes |
+----------------------------------------------------+
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The issuing parties should create ROAs containing the following:
Org A:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 16 |
+----------------------------------------------+
| | 10.1.0.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org A issues for Org B:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64511 | 10.1.16.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org C:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64502 | 10.1.32.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
5.3. Grandchild Does Not Participate in RPKI
Consider the previous example, with an extension by which Org B, who
does not participate in RPKI, further allocates 10.1.17.0/24 to Org X
with ASN 64505. Org X does not participate in RPKI.
The desired announcements (and organizations with RPKI adoption)
would be:
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organization | RPKI |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS 64496 | Org A | Yes |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS 64496 | Org A | Yes |
| 10.1.16.0/20 | AS 64511 | Org B | No |
| 10.1.32.0/20 | AS 64502 | Org C | Yes |
| 10.1.17.0/24 | AS 64505 | Org X | No |
+----------------------------------------------------+
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The issuing parties should create ROAs containing the following:
Org A:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 16 |
+----------------------------------------------+
| | 10.1.0.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org A issues for Org B:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64511 | 10.1.16.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org A issues for Org B's customer Org X:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64505 | 10.1.17.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org C:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64502 | 10.1.32.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
6. Transfer Use Cases
For transfer use cases, based on the preceding sections, it should be
easy to deduce what new ROAs need to be created and what existing
ROAs need to be maintained (or revoked). The resource transfer and
timing of revocation/creation of the ROAs need to be performed based
on the make-before-break principle and using suitable Regional
Internet Registry (RIR) procedures (see Section 2.1).
6.1. Transfer of In-Use Prefix and Autonomous System Number
Org A holds the resource 10.1.0.0/20, and it is currently in use and
originated from AS 64496 with valid RPKI objects in place. Org B has
acquired both the prefix and ASN and desires an RPKI transfer on a
particular date and time without adversely affecting the operational
use of the resource.
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The following RPKI objects would be created/revoked:
For Org A, revoke the following ROA:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
For Org B, add the following ROA:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/20 | 20 |
+----------------------------------------------+
6.2. Transfer of In-Use Prefix
Org A holds the resource 10.1.0.0/16, and it is currently in use and
originated from AS 64496 with valid RPKI objects in place. Org A has
agreed to transfer the entire /16 address block to Org B and will no
longer originate the prefix or more specifics of it. Consequently,
Org B desires an RPKI transfer of this resource on a particular date
and time. This prefix will be originated by AS 64511 as a result of
this transfer.
The following RPKI objects would be created/revoked:
For Org A, revoke the following ROA:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 16 |
+----------------------------------------------+
For Org B, add the following ROA when the
resource certificate for 10.1.0.0/16 is issued
to them (Org B):
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64511 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 16 |
+----------------------------------------------+
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6.3. Transfer of Unused Prefix
Org A holds the resources 10.1.0.0/16 and AS 64507 (with RPKI
objects). Org A currently announces 10.1.0.0/16 from AS 64507.
Org B has acquired an unused portion (10.1.4.0/24) of the prefix from
Org A and desires an RPKI transfer on a particular date and time.
Org B will originate a route 10.1.4.0/24 from AS 64496.
The following RPKI objects would be created/sustained:
For Org A, leave the following ROA unchanged:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64507 | 10.1.0.0/16 | 16 |
+----------------------------------------------+
For Org B, add the following ROA when the
resource certificate for 10.1.4.0/24 is issued
to them (Org B):
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.4.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
Org A may optionally provide ROA coverage for Org B by creating the
following ROA preceding the RPKI transfer. The ROA itself is then
naturally revoked when 10.1.4.0/24 is transferred to Org B's resource
certificate.
Org A adds the following ROA:
+----------------------------------------------+
| asID | address | maxLength |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 64496 | 10.1.4.0/24 | 24 |
+----------------------------------------------+
7. Relying Party Use Cases
7.1. Prefix-Origin Validation Use Cases
These use cases try to systematically enumerate the situations a
relying party may encounter while receiving a BGP update and making
use of ROA information to interpret the validity of the prefix-origin
information in the routes derived from the update. We enumerate the
situations or scenarios and include a recommendation for the expected
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outcome of prefix-origin validation. For a description of prefix-
origin validation algorithms, see [RFC6483] and [RFC6811]. We use
the terms Valid, Invalid, and NotFound as defined in [RFC6811] and
summarized earlier in Section 1.3. Also see [RFC6472] for a
recommendation to deprecate AS_SETs in BGP updates. The use cases
described here can be potentially used as test cases for testing and
evaluation of prefix-origin validation in router implementations;
see, for example, [BRITE].
7.1.1. Covering ROA Prefix, maxLength Satisfied, and AS Match
ROA: {10.1.0.0/16, maxLength = 20, AS 64496}
Route has {10.1.0.0/17, Origin = AS 64496}
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route is
Valid.
Comment: The route prefix has a covering ROA prefix, and the route
origin ASN matches the ROA ASN. This is a straightforward prefix-
origin validation use case; it follows from the primary intention
of creation of the ROA by a prefix holder.
7.1.2. Covering ROA Prefix, maxLength Exceeded, and AS Match
ROA: {10.1.0.0/16, maxLength = 20, AS 64496}
Route has {10.1.0.0/22, Origin = AS 64496}
No other covering ROA
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route is
Invalid.
Comment: In this case, the maxLength specified in the ROA is
exceeded by the route prefix.
7.1.3. Covering ROA Prefix, maxLength Satisfied, and AS Mismatch
ROA: {10.1.0.0/16, maxLength = 24, AS 64496}
Route has {10.1.88.0/24, Origin = AS 64511}
No other covering ROA
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Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route is
Invalid.
Comment: In this case, an AS other than the one specified in the ROA
is originating the route. This may be a prefix or subprefix
hijack situation.
7.1.4. Covering ROA Prefix, maxLength Exceeded, and AS Mismatch
ROA: {10.1.0.0/16, maxLength = 22, AS 64496}
Route has {10.1.88.0/24, Origin = AS 64511}
No other covering ROA
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route is
Invalid.
Comment: In this case, the maxLength specified in the ROA is
exceeded by the route prefix, and also an AS other than the one
specified in the ROA is originating the route. This may be a
subprefix hijack situation.
7.1.5. Covering ROA Prefix Not Found
Route has {10.1.3.0/24, Origin = AS 64511}
No covering ROA
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route's
validation status is NotFound.
Comment: In this case, there is no covering ROA for the route
prefix. It could be a prefix or subprefix hijack situation, but
this announcement does not contradict any existing ROA. During
partial deployment, there would be some legitimate prefix-origin
announcements for which ROAs may not have been issued yet.
7.1.6. Covering ROA Prefix and the ROA Is an AS 0 ROA
ROA: {10.1.0.0/16, maxLength = 32, AS 0}
Route has {10.1.5.0/24, Origin = AS 64511}
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route's
validation status is Invalid.
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Comment: An AS 0 ROA implies by definition that the prefix listed in
it and all of the more specifics of that prefix should not be used
in a routing context [RFC6483] [AS0-PROC]. Also, please see
related comments in Section 1.3.
7.1.7. Covering ROA Prefix Not Found but ROAs Exist for a Covering Set
of More Specifics
ROA: {10.1.0.0/18, maxLength = 20, AS 64496}
ROA: {10.1.64.0/18, maxLength = 20, AS 64496}
ROA: {10.1.128.0/18, maxLength = 20, AS 64496}
ROA: {10.1.192.0/18, maxLength = 20, AS 64496}
Route has {10.1.0.0/16, Origin = AS 64496}
No covering ROA
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route's
validation status is NotFound.
Comment: In this case, the route prefix is an aggregate (/16), and
it turns out that there exist ROAs for more specifics (/18s) that,
if combined, can help support validation of the announced prefix-
origin pair. But it is very hard in general to break up an
announced prefix into constituent more specifics and check for ROA
coverage for those more specifics, and hence this type of
accommodation is not recommended.
7.1.8. AS_SET in Route and Covering ROA Prefix Not Found
Route has {10.1.0.0/16, AS_SET [AS 64496, AS 64497, AS 64498,
AS 64499] appears in the rightmost position in the AS_PATH}
No covering ROA
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route's
validation status is NotFound.
Comment: An extremely small percentage (~0.1%) of external BGP
(eBGP) updates are seen to have an AS_SET in them; this is known
as proxy aggregation. In this case, the route with the AS_SET
does not conflict with any ROA (i.e., the route prefix has no
covering ROA prefix). Therefore, the route gets NotFound
validation status.
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7.1.9. Singleton AS in AS_SET (in the Route), Covering ROA Prefix, and
AS Match
Route has {10.1.0.0/24, AS_SET [AS 64496] appears in the rightmost
position in the AS_PATH}
ROA: {10.1.0.0/22, maxLength = 24, AS 64496}
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route is
Invalid.
Comment: In the spirit of [RFC6472], any route with an AS_SET in it
should not be considered valid (by ROA-based validation). If the
route contains an AS_SET and a covering ROA prefix exists for the
route prefix, then the route should get an Invalid status.
(Note: AS match or mismatch consideration does not apply.)
7.1.10. Singleton AS in AS_SET (in the Route), Covering ROA Prefix, and
AS Mismatch
Route has {10.1.0.0/24, AS_SET [AS 64496] appears in the rightmost
position in the AS_PATH}
ROA: {10.1.0.0/22, maxLength = 24, AS 64511}
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route is
Invalid.
Comment: If the route contains an AS_SET and a covering ROA prefix
exists for the route prefix, then the route should get an Invalid
status. (Note: AS match or mismatch consideration does not
apply.)
7.1.11. Multiple ASs in AS_SET (in the Route) and Covering ROA Prefix
Route has {10.1.0.0/22, AS_SET [AS 64496, AS 64497, AS 64498,
AS 64499] appears in the rightmost position in the AS_PATH}
ROA: {10.1.0.0/22, maxLength = 24, AS 64509}
No other covering ROA
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route is
Invalid.
Comment: If the route contains an AS_SET and a covering ROA prefix
exists for the route prefix, then the route should get an Invalid
status.
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7.1.12. Multiple ASs in AS_SET (in the Route) and ROAs Exist for a
Covering Set of More Specifics
ROA: {10.1.0.0/18, maxLength = 20, AS 64496}
ROA: {10.1.64.0/18, maxLength = 20, AS 64497}
ROA: {10.1.128.0/18, maxLength = 20, AS 64498}
ROA: {10.1.192.0/18, maxLength = 20, AS 64499}
Route has {10.1.0.0/16, AS_SET [AS 64496, AS 64497, AS 64498,
AS 64499] appears in the rightmost position in the AS_PATH}
No covering ROA
Recommended RPKI prefix-origin validation interpretation: Route's
validation status is NotFound.
Comment: In this case, the aggregate of the prefixes in the ROAs is
a covering prefix (i.e., exact match or less specific) relative to
the route prefix. The ASs in each of the contributing ROAs
together form a set that matches the AS_SET in the route. But it
is very hard in general to break up an announced prefix into
constituent more specifics and check for ROA coverage for those
more specifics. In any case, it may be noted once again that in
the spirit of [RFC6472], any route with an AS_SET in it should not
be considered valid (by ROA-based validation). In fact, the route
under consideration would have received an Invalid status if the
route prefix had at least one covering ROA prefix.
7.2. ROA Expiry or Receipt of a CRL Revoking a ROA
Here we enumerate use cases corresponding to router actions when RPKI
objects expire or are revoked. In the cases that follow, the terms
"expired ROA" or "revoked ROA" are shorthand and describe the expiry
or revocation of the End Entity (EE) or resource certificate that
causes a relying party to consider the corresponding ROA to have
expired or been revoked, respectively.
7.2.1. ROA of Parent Prefix Is Revoked
A certificate revocation list (CRL) is received that reveals that the
ROA {10.1.0.0/22, maxLength = 24, ASN 64496} is revoked. Further, a
route exists in the Internet routing system for 10.1.3.0/24
originated from ASN 64496. In the absence of said revoked ROA, no
covering ROA prefix exists for the route prefix (i.e., 10.1.3.0/24).
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The Relying Party interpretation would be: Route's validation status
is NotFound.
7.2.2. ROA of Prefix Revoked while Parent Prefix Has Covering ROA
Prefix with Different ASN
A CRL is received that reveals that the ROA {10.1.3.0/24,
maxLength = 24, ASN 64496} is revoked. Further, a route exists in
the Internet routing system for 10.1.3.0/24 originated from
ASN 64496. Additionally, a valid ROA exists for a parent prefix
10.1.0.0/22, and said ROA is {10.1.0.0/22, maxLength = 24,
ASN 64511}. No other covering ROA exists for the 10.1.3.0/24 prefix.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: Route is Invalid.
7.2.3. ROA of Prefix Revoked while That of Parent Prefix Prevails
A CRL is received that reveals that the ROA {10.1.3.0/24,
maxLength = 24, ASN 64496} is revoked. Further, a route exists in
the Internet routing system for 10.1.3.0/24 originated from
ASN 64496. Additionally, a valid ROA exists for a parent prefix
10.1.0.0/22, and said ROA is {10.1.0.0/22, maxLength = 24,
ASN 64496}.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: Route is Valid.
(Clarification: Perhaps the revocation of the ROA for prefix
10.1.3.0/24 was initiated just to eliminate redundancy.)
7.2.4. ROA of Grandparent Prefix Revoked while That of Parent Prefix
Prevails
A CRL is received that reveals that the ROA {10.1.0.0/20,
maxLength = 24, ASN 64496} is revoked. Further, a route exists in
the Internet routing system for 10.1.3.0/24 originated from
ASN 64496. Additionally, a valid ROA exists for a parent prefix
10.1.0.0/22, and said ROA is {10.1.0.0/22, maxLength = 24,
ASN 64496}.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: Route is Valid.
(Clarification: The ROA for less specific grandparent prefix
10.1.0.0/20 was revoked or withdrawn.)
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7.2.5. Expiry of ROA of Parent Prefix
A scan of the ROA list reveals that the ROA {10.1.0.0/22,
maxLength = 24, ASN 64496} has expired. Further, a route exists in
the Internet routing system for 10.1.3.0/24 originated from
ASN 64496. In the absence of said expired ROA, no covering ROA
prefix exists for the route prefix (i.e., 10.1.3.0/24).
The Relying Party interpretation would be: Route's validation status
is NotFound.
7.2.6. Expiry of ROA of Prefix while Parent Prefix Has Covering ROA
with Different ASN
A scan of the ROA list reveals that the ROA {10.1.3.0/24,
maxLength = 24, ASN 64496} has expired. Further, a route exists in
the Internet routing system for 10.1.3.0/24 originated from
ASN 64496. Additionally, a valid ROA exists for a parent prefix
10.1.0.0/22, and said ROA is {10.1.0.0/22, maxLength = 24,
ASN 64511}. No other covering ROA exists for the prefix (i.e.,
10.1.3.0/24).
The Relying Party interpretation would be: Route is Invalid.
7.2.7. Expiry of ROA of Prefix while That of Parent Prefix Prevails
A scan of the ROA list reveals that the ROA {10.1.3.0/24,
maxLength = 24, ASN 64496} has expired. Further, a route exists in
the Internet routing system for 10.1.3.0/24 originated from
ASN 64496. Additionally, a valid ROA exists for a parent prefix
10.1.0.0/22, and said ROA is {10.1.0.0/22, maxLength = 24,
ASN 64496}.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: Route is Valid.
7.2.8. Expiry of ROA of Grandparent Prefix while That of Parent Prefix
Prevails
A scan of the ROA list reveals that the ROA {10.1.0.0/20,
maxLength = 24, ASN 64496} has expired. Further, a route exists in
the Internet routing system for 10.1.3.0/24 originated from
ASN 64496. Additionally, a valid ROA exists for a parent prefix
10.1.0.0/22, and said ROA is {10.1.0.0/22, maxLength = 24,
ASN 64496}.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: Route is Valid.
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8. Acknowledgements
The authors are indebted to both Sandy Murphy and Sam Weiler for
their guidance. Further, the authors would like to thank Steve Kent,
Warren Kumari, Randy Bush, Curtis Villamizar, and Danny McPherson for
their technical insight and review. The authors also wish to thank
Elwyn Davies, Stephen Farrell, Barry Leiba, Stewart Bryant, Alexey
Melnikov, and Russ Housley for their review and comments during the
IESG review process.
9. Security Considerations
This memo requires no security considerations.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
February 2012.
10.2. Informative References
[AS0-PROC] Kumari, W., Bush, R., Schiller, H., and K. Patel,
"Codification of AS 0 processing", Work in Progress,
August 2012.
[BRITE] NIST, "BRITE - BGPSEC / RPKI Interoperability Test &
Evaluation", Developed by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, Maryland,
2011, <http://brite.antd.nist.gov/statics/about>.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
Manderson, et al. Informational [Page 30]
RFC 6907 RPKI Use Cases and Interpretations March 2013
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5737] Arkko, J., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IPv4 Address Blocks
Reserved for Documentation", RFC 5737, January 2010.
[RFC6472] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using
AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472,
December 2011.
[RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs)", RFC 6483, February 2012.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
January 2013.
Authors' Addresses
Terry Manderson
ICANN
EMail: terry.manderson@icann.org
Kotikalapudi Sriram
US NIST
EMail: ksriram@nist.gov
Russ White
Verisign
EMail: russ@riw.us
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